Suchergebnisse

Executive power in the Constitution was left ambiguous and underdefined. Commentators have questioned presidential claims of inherent executive and war powers. Have the president and his subordinates obeyed the Constitution and adhered to the letter and spirit of the law? Have legal commentators and courts properly construed constitutional clauses, especially those dealing with war powers? I start with the idea that the Constitution is a power base for government officials and that construing the Constitution is a political act. As political scientists, we can observe presidents and their counsel substitute novel interpretations of presidential prerogatives when they claim the president has inherent war powers and related diplomatic and national security powers that override statute law or bypass the constitutional prerogatives of Congress, and we can analyze the conditions under which their substitution of executive prerogative power will succeed or fail.

We explore the effects of a particular facet of separation of powers—namely, the executive's independence from the legislature—on maintaining a norm of legislative restraint in which antagonistic factions refrain from passing laws that infringe on their rival's liberties. Our main result establishes that executive independence may sometimes undermine and at other times facilitate legislative restraint, depending on the probabilities with which the factions hold legislative and executive power. Our results contribute to the larger game-theoretic literature exploring the effects of political institutions; our results also contribute to the literature exploring how institutions designed to protect liberty affect tacit cooperation among rival factions.